The Chilling:

Recommendations for action responding to online violence against women journalists

Including an online violence response assessment framework

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The following research-based recommendations are proposed for consideration by key responders to online violence against women journalists globally. They were commissioned by UNESCO and are also included in the comprehensive report "The Chilling: A global study of online violence against women journalists", edited by Julie Posetti and Nabeela Shabbir, published with the support of UNESCO in November 2022.

Cross-cutting recommendations for multiple stakeholders:

1. Recognise that online violence is **"real",** as is the **psychological injury** it causes.

2. **Avoid blaming women journalists** for the online violence they experience, and do not expect them to bear the responsibility for managing or combatting the problem.

3. Recognise that the problem of online violence manifests itself in the context of **powerful and wealthy internet companies** that should be held to account for enabling, and responding to, threats, harassment and hateful abuse directed at women journalists.

4. Facilitate and encourage **coordinated, global multi-stakeholder cooperation** and exchange of good practice **between States, internet companies and news organisation**s in the interests of effective implementation of holistic measures.

5. Foster and fund **collaborative** responses involving civil society organisations, journalists' networks, news organisations and researchers to gain more granular **knowledge** about the problem.

6. Ensure that **research** conducted on the issue is genuinely **independent,** and that it covers the **fast-moving nature and scale** of online violence and social media company responses, as well as addressing abuse on **closed networks** (e.g., private messaging apps and direct messaging platform functions) and coordinated cross-platform trolling.

7. Recognise the **intersectional** threats associated with gendered online violence, such as **racism, religious bigotry, sectarianism, antisemitism, homophobia and transphobia,** and respond accordingly - including through policy development and training.

8. Encourage and aid women journalists to **report** online violence to the social media companies, their employers, and law enforcement where appropriate, while also recognising the priority need to **emphasise preventative and protective responses** that do not rely on the targets of abuse to manage the problem.

9. Encourage development of more **effective responses,** and ensure that these are **aligned with international human rights standards,** per the 25-step protocol outlined below

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News organisations should:

10. Recognise gendered online violence as a **workplace safety issue** experienced by their journalists (whether staff or freelance). Understand that **this applies regardless of whether or not the abuse is directed** at the journalist on their own news website, or a digital service owned by a third party.

11. Ensure that online violence is understood as **"real"** and that **psychological injury** suffered by women journalists under attack is recognised as **serious.**

12. Acknowledge the **increased intersectional risks** and impacts facing women journalists at the **nexus of misogyny, racism, religious bigotry, homophobia, transphobia** and other forms of discrimination which require recognition in editorial guidelines and online violence response protocols.

13. Recognise the correlation (and potential causal link) **between online violence and offline attacks,** and respond accordingly by ensuring that defensive strategies integrate physical safety, digital security, psychosocial support (including access to specialised trauma-aware counselling), editorial responses and legal assistance.

14. **Avoid making women journalists responsible** for their own protection and defence.

15. Develop or improve **newsroom protocols** that can address online violence against women journalists, recognising their **additional exposure** to risk.

16. Such protocols should be designed to **identify, monitor, prevent and respond** to online violence. They should be sensitive to intersectional threats, and it should also be regularly reviewed so that it is **responsive to the changing nature** of gendered online violence.

17. Ensure that these protocols take account of **contexts** of weaponised social media platforms, viral **disinformation,** far right extremism and conspiracy networks.

18. Establish procedures and systems that **cover both staff and freelancers.**

19. Call on **law enforcement officers** to protect those targeted and prosecute perpetrators in those countries and circumstances where it is safe to do so (bearing in mind intersectionalities and global realities).

20. Collect and analyse **data** related to online violence and its effects, as experienced by staff and freelancers, and create a **gender-disaggregated database** of specific occurrences, and any follow-up. Use this internally to keep protocols under review, and make it **available** to trusted researchers internationally, so that the changing nature of attacks can be monitored, and the efficacy of remedial action can be evaluated.

21. Provide **targeted education and training initiatives** to staff and freelancers.

22. Appoint a **Digital Safety Editor** with capabilities and responsibilities that bridge editorial functions, digital security, and journalism safety. This position should include selection criteria that reflect the need for gender-awareness and understanding of intersectional threats and impacts.

23. Assign a **point person/team** to deal with the monitoring and reporting of attacks across platforms, private messaging, email, and across different devices when a woman journalist is under attack.

24. Lead from the top: Create a **company culture of gender equality and zero tolerance** for threats and harassment (online or offline) against staff, or women journalists at other outlets.

25. Put in place clear and transparent procedures related to **content and comment moderation on corporate websites,** along with clear **community guidelines**, and **train** relevant staff accordingly. Apply these principles - where possible - to the social media communities created and curated by the news organisation.

26. Hold social media companies to account through **investigative reporting,** and through **advocac**y for media freedom and journalism safety, regardless of commercial ties to the platforms.

27. Use **investigative and data journalism as countermeasures** to both raise awareness of gendered online violence, and to investigate and expose perpetrators (including orchestrated and/or State-sponsored attacks).

28. Ensure that coverage **avoids inflaming online mobs** targeting women journalists by amplifying and legitimising their attacks.

29. Avoid "victim-blaming" and speech-restrictions when responding to gendered online violence cases, recognising that the **target is not to blame** for the abuse, harassment, or threats to which she is subjected. **Empower** her to speak, recognising that **"don't feed the trolls" is an inadequate response.**

30. Ensure that **policies on social media use represent a 'two-way street'** - where the obligations of the journalist to behave professionally on social media are **matched by a commitment to support and defend** her when she comes under attack.

31. Work **collaboratively** with other media organisations, professional associations and civil society organisations to monitor online violence, create robust integrated **models of risk assessment,** evaluate **recovery models,** and create **industry-standard guidelines, support systems and training.**

32. Lobby governments to formally recognise that online violence directed at journalists is an **attack on freedom of expression (including press freedom),** and that it has a **disproportionate impact** on women and marginalised journalists.

33. Lobby social media companies to recognise the **special needs and status** of women journalists – with sensitivity to intersectional risks – and introduce **rapid response units** focused on the safety of journalists, with human points of contact.

34. Support regulation to **make social media companies accountable** for the safety of women journalists on their services.

35. Act on the November 2021 recommendation from the Council of Europe Expert Group on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, which encourages media organisations and journalists unions to: "take concrete steps to **eradicate** gender-based discrimination, **victim-blaming attitudes** and **violations of the privacy** of victims of gender-based violence against women and their children in all their journalistic activities. Further efforts should be undertaken to **uproot male-dominated power dynamics** in media landscapes".

Internet companies should:

36. Continuously review their **policies, algorithms and moderation processes,** to address the evolving nature of gender-based online violence, while working closely with women journalists and civil society groups to **co-design new solutions.**

37. Develop more **sophisticated abuse reporting systems** with capacity for **escalation** for women journalists under attack (and their employers), recognising their particular vulnerabilities along with the implications for press freedom.

38. Implement a **coordinated multi-stakeholder approach** to protecting women journalists from online harms, which brings together all platforms, female journalists, civil society, news organisations, governments, and independent experts - at national and international levels.

39. Initiate **platform-platform cooperation,** since online violence often jumps across platforms and exploits the weaknesses of each.

40. Implement proactive countermeasures which **reverse the onus** on women targets having to report online violence to start with. This might involve using **human moderators and artificial intelligence technology** to more effectively filter out threats, abuse and harassment at the point of origin.

41. Retain **data documenting attacks** to aid targets wishing to access and use it for research or legal actions. Such proactive steps could link to monitoring processes to develop an 'early warning system' so as to better protect women journalists at the outset, or in the midst of an attack.

42. Build shields that enable users to **proactively filter abuse which could be quarantined for review and response.** Such systems should also provide prioritised pathways for women journalists under attack and news organisations seeking to report online violence.

43. Provide authorised independent researchers with secure and privacy-preserving **access to archives of moderated content and user appeals** in a standardised format, to enable **transparency and independent audits of moderation decisions** about threats made to women journalists.

44. Use the findings of such independent audits to **adjust both human and algorithmic moderation practices,** to strike a better balance between protecting freedom of expression and prohibiting abuse.

45. Implement an effective **human-in-the-loop approach** to content moderation coupled with a timely and effective appeals process - including effective **systems to appeal against company refusals** to act against online violent content and perpetrators.

46. Report transparently on **how human moderators and artificial intelligence algorithms are trained** to detect online abuse.

47. Define effective **policies for detecting and penalising repeat offenders,** to stop the same abusers assuming new online identities after action taken such as suspension or de-platforming.

48. Develop **markers for abuse perpetrator accounts,** similar to systems used to identify disinformation purveyors.

49. Establish **clear and transparent community rules** on what constitutes online violence and cease making exceptions **for influencers, public figures and other high-profile actors,** whose high number of followers makes it easy for them to instigate abuse pile-ons.

50. Create **more effective content moderation tools** that provide sufficient support for all languages in which their services are offered (including

vernacular or slang), and which are sensitive to contextual and cultural norms.

51. Technical solutions should be supported by **human contact points** who are familiar with a country's cultural, linguistic, and religious context and are well versed in local languages. These people should also possess press freedom, gender and journalism safety **expertise,** and be able to assist women journalists under attack.

52. Establish **task forces** and carry out **proactive programmes** to protect women journalists from certain abuse types, such as the dissemination of intimate images and doxxing.

53. Take effective **steps against the use of bots, false accounts and sock puppet networks** to prevent coordinated attacks and pile-ons that are frequently used in targeted online violence against women journalists.

54. Conduct **regular human rights impact assessments** as well as retrospective studies into the problem, including review of company policies and responses to gender-based online violence, and make the findings **public.**

55. Provide **detailed transparency reports on actions taken** against online violence against women journalists, broken down on a national level and including meaningful quantifiable metrics, beyond the total number of accounts removed and posts moderated. Reports need to also include **appeals and their outcomes,** along with **data** about notifications and responses to online violence reported by women journalists. They should also include **statistical representation and analysis of content that stays up after being reported** by journalists as abusive, offensive or threatening - not just on what is taken down.

56. Monitor the **intersectional nature of attacks** on women journalists who are targeted more than others because they belong to religious or ethnic minorities, indigenous groups or identify as members of the LGBTQ community.

57. Strike a **better balance between supporting freedom of expression and prohibiting online violence,** and recognise that international human rights law requires that women journalists be able to work online free from threats and harassment.

58. Support **independent research** (i.e. with no strings attached) on campaigns of violence against women journalists, and responses to these.

Individual States should:

59. Ensure that laws and regulations that could protect women journalists offline are **applied equally online.**

60. As urged by UN GA A/RES/74/157 (2019), collect and analyse "...concrete quantitative and qualitative data on online and offline attacks or violence against journalists, that are disaggregated by, among other factors, sex...". Create a **national evidence database** tracking perpetrators of online violence against women journalists.

61. Consider introducing **protocols and guidelines to restrain elected representatives, their staff, and other officials** who engage in gendered online violence against women journalists, with punitive measures attached, and **ensure prosecution** of those who perpetrate attacks. (See also recommendations for political parties below).

62. Make social media companies more clearly accountable for combatting online violence against women journalists. Arrive at a **clear legal definition** of what social networks and messaging services are, and how they are regulated under national laws, with a view to regulating for the protection of women journalists and other human rights defenders working on these platforms (in alignment with the 25-step protocol presented below).

63. Consider **taxing social media companies** to provide revenues that could help **fund the work of monitoring, protection and training** relevant to online attacks on women journalists.

64. Make the companies more clearly **accountable** even in countries where these entities are not directly incorporated. This could include **a requirement to provide adequate reporting and response mechanisms in the languages on their services,** as well as adequate provision of a **timely appeals mechanism** and recourse to an independent national **ombudsperson** to help arbitrate cases where platforms and journalists cannot reach a settlement.

65. Regulate for the availability and comprehensive functionalities of **tools that enable users to easily report** online violence to the platforms and escalate appropriately, but ensure such regulatory and legislative interventions **respect freedom of expression** (refer to the 25-step protocol below).

66. Require social media companies to **notify users** who have reported online violence, on what actions have been taken, when and why/why not. These responses could include **referrals to informed civil society organisations and effective resources** (e.g., the Online Violence Response Hub).[1]

67. Introduce clear and effective **transparency regulations** for the companies with respect to: **gender disaggregation** in their reporting content moderation statistics; changes in **detection and moderation algorithms;** the number and types of **notices received and acted upon** in a given period; the **volume and topics of local content** that have attracted labels, distribution **restrictions, warnings, demonetisation** measures, or content that has been **removed or restricted** in circulation, and the **numbers and types of users who have been suspended or de-platformed.** Additional useful data points could include the

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number of users and engagement on a national level, as well as revenues in the national market.

68. Regulate to require **transparent and gender-disaggregated reporting regarding 'takedown' notices** connected to targeted online violence against women journalists, and protection of victims of doxxing and the distribution of sexual imagery shared non-consensually.

69. Establish or reinforce **independent national bodies/regulators** to oversee compliance with the relevant national and international laws and regulations designed to defend the safety of women journalists.

70. Introduce regulation that provides victims of online violence with **access to appeals against company (in)action** through an independent, national ombuds facility.

71. Regulate against the **social media 'black market',** which enables coordinated attacks **through sale of** accounts, views, likes, and comments.

72. Strengthen **labour laws and universal health care** to help support women journalists, especially those in precarious employment, when they are targeted in online violence campaigns which involve attempts to get them fired from their jobs.

73. Remedy possible jurisdictional issues by allowing **legal action based on the victims' location,** rather than the alleged perpetrators', to allow for action against harassment that originates in different locations.

74. Consider **introducing legislation** such as Ireland's Harassment, Harmful Communications and Related Offences Act 2020, which criminalises the publication and distribution of threats or "grossly offensive" messages with the intention to cause harm. (Any such legislation should **reflect the 25 principles for preserving freedom of expression in the context of legislative countermeasures** that are laid out below, emphasising **transparency, necessity and proportionality).**

75. Regulate, where needed, to **preserve the anonymity of complainants** and offer **closed court proceedings** for trials, to encourage more targets of gendered online violence (including acts of 'revenge porn') to come forward without fear of drawing further attention to the abuse;

76. Review the utility of **'shield laws'** that protect third-party internet platforms hosting harassing content from civil liability.

77. Ensure **hate speech legislation covers both gender and sex** (in addition to race, ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation) to combat misogynistic expressions of online violence, and provide access to additional **opportunities** for legal redress for women journalists subjected to misogynistic hate speech.

78. Review laws in order to deal with 'pile on' forms of harassment through a **'proportionality' requirement** in online harassment, indicating whether a one-off comment could cause lesser or greater harm to the victim.

79. **Criminalise doxxing** and threats to dox women journalists.

80. Allow legal action on the basis of **complaints from third parties** (e.g., bystanders or employers) to **avoid the onus** being on the victim of gendered online harassment to file a complaint.

81. Help fund **pro bono legal services** specially equipped to deal with gendered online violence, so as to alleviate the costs of litigation, and increase the likelihood of successful court action brought by women journalists against online violence perpetrators.

Political parties and other political actors should:

82. **Desist from mounting attacks** (on- and offline) on women journalists, recognising that such conduct can trigger or dangerously inflame threats to their safety.

83. Develop **policies, procedures and guidelines requiring party members and officials to avoid instigating, facilitating or fuelling attacks** against women journalists.

84. **Sanction members and officials** who take part in acts of online violence in general and particularly against women journalists.

85. Introduce **training modules for party members,** including highlighting responsibilities as stakeholders.

Law enforcement agencies and judicial actors should:

86. Acknowledge the connection between online violence and offline harm for targeted journalists, including the risk of escalation to sexual assault and murder, but also serious psychological injury.

87. Participate in expert-led education programmes for judicial actors and law enforcement agents to improve their media and information literacy as regards digital freedom of expression and the implications of online violence for press freedom and the safety of women journalists.

88. Participate in expert-led education programmes for law enforcement officials, including police, on the best response to initial reports of targeted online violence against women journalists.

89. Improve social media literacy to support basic knowledge of the operation of contemporary digital media systems and develop basic digital investigative skills.

90. Encourage training in digital forensics to aid and improve investigative capabilities.

91. Acknowledge the connection between online violence and offline harm for targeted journalists, including the risk of escalation to sexual assault and murder, but also serious psychological injury.

Civil society organisations should:

92. Reinforce the **call for effective responses** to online abuse of female journalists, and monitor how these conform to **international human rights standards.**

93. **Partner** with journalists, news organisations and researchers on investigative and monitoring projects about online violence and responses to it.

94. Help **educate** women journalists in particular in online safety, effective use of technological tools, engaging in employer advocacy and securing legal support.

95. Collaborate on the development of a **global online violence response hub**[2].

96. Commission **interdisciplinary big data case studies,** modelled on those produced in parallel with this research, to inform and tailor responses for **diverse national, regional, cultural and linguistic settings, and intersectional experiences.**

97. Ensure **all media development and journalism safety programmes** and projects feature **responses relevant** to the threat of gendered online violence.

98. Work with the companies to establish a **cross-platform response system** to high-level threats against women journalists, recognising the cross-platform nature of abuse and its implications for offline violence.

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2   One such hub is co-convened by IWMF and ICFJ: https://onlineviolenceresponsehub.org/

Intergovernmental organisations, including UNESCO, should:

99. Ensure that **mechanisms and protocols** to defend the safety of journalists and end impunity address online violence against women journalists, including use of **cross-border and cross-platform** dimensions.

100. Monitor, research, record and publish evidence, and speak out against, online violence associated with crimes against journalists, with findings presented in a **gender-responsive and gender-disaggregated** manner.

101. Recognise and respond to the **problem of State actors using force extraterritorially** through online attacks on women journalists.

102. Consider initiating a **multi-stakeholder, research-informed 'early warning system'**[3] (drawing on datasets such as those underpinning the two big data companion case studies in this study) to trigger **interventions** (including from UN Special Rapporteurs), in cases where there is a significant and/or repeated risk to the target under attack online.

103. Ensure that **key officials** have an **appropriate understanding of causes and consequences** of online violence targeting women journalists, and encourage them to make appropriate representations to social media companies and political actors.

104. Consider a **UN-level conduit** to channel complaints against social media companies and State actors engaged in targeted online violence campaigns transnationally.

105. Develop and provide **gender-sensitive training and education for lawmakers, law enforcement agencies and the judiciary** to enable them to deal more effectively and appropriately with online violence against women journalists.

106. Monitor the implementation and effectiveness of member States' responses to gender-based online violence against women journalists, recognising that **legislative, legal and policy-based responses are one thing and implementation is another.**

107. Ensure that programmes focused on **media development** incorporate holistic education and training to deal with gendered online violence against journalists.

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3 A comprehensive bibliography accompanying this study is published separately by ICFJ here

Online Violence Response Assessment Framework

This 25-step tool can guide responses to online violence against women journalists at the legislative, legal, and policy levels with regard to international human rights laws and norms.[1]

1. Do the responses recognise online violence as violence, and the psychological impacts as real?

2. Have the responses been developed under a gender-sensitive lens, which takes account of the increased risks facing women journalists, and especially those at the intersection of misogyny, racism, religious bigotry, sectarianism and other forms of discrimination? And are they framed in a way to alleviate discrimination?

3. Do the responses recognise misogyny and sex-based discrimination as forms of hate speech, acknowledging that misogyny should be treated as seriously as hate speech that is focused on race/ethnicity, religion, disability, sexual orientation, and gender identity?

4. Are journalists able to receive effective judicial protection from hateful content received in the course of their work which incites hostility, violence and discrimination, even if it has not (yet) triggered offline attacks?

5. Do the responses clearly and transparently identify the specific problems such as threats of physical and sexual violence; the enabling role of social media companies; and practices by officials or foreign State actors that impact negatively on the safety of journalists? Do the responses recognise impact on critical independent journalism (e.g., reporting focused on gender-based violence, election integrity, or disinformation networks)?

6. Do the responses impinge on, or limit, freedom of expression, press freedom, access to information and privacy rights? If so, and if the circumstances triggering the response are considered appropriate for such intervention (e.g., a threat to human life or incitement to violence), is the interference narrowly-defined, necessary and proportionate?

1. This tool was developed by the lead researcher, Julie Posetti

7. Does a given response (unintentionally or otherwise) risk restricting journalistic functions such as reporting, publishing and confidentiality of source communications; does it limit the right of access to public interest information (refer to 6. above)? Responses in this category could include: hate speech laws; communications interception and surveillance; data retention and handover; anonymity and encryption overrides. If the measures do impinge on these journalistic functions, or on accountability of duty-bearers to rights-holders in general, do they provide exemptions for acts of journalism?

8. Do responses include an impact assessment as regards consequences for international human rights frameworks that support freedom of expression, press freedom, access to information or privacy? Do such assessments take account of the fact that women journalists have a right to work online free from hate speech, including misogynistic abuse and other online violence?

9. Are the responses (e.g., legislative, normative, legal, etc.) considered together and holistically in terms of their different roles, complementarities and possible contradictions?

10. Do the responses avoid the false binary position that the right to freedom of expression cannot co-exist with, or be balanced against, the right to be protected from online violence which inhibits free expression?

11. Have the responses been the subject of multi-stakeholder engagement and input (especially with civil society organisations, industry representatives, specialist researchers, and press freedom experts) in their formulation, implementation and review?

12. In the case of legislative responses, has there been appropriate opportunity for deliberation prior to adoption, and do the laws and regulations provide for independent oversight of implementation and recourse to appeal?

13. Are responses primarily restrictive (e.g., criminalisation of misogynistic online attacks; regulatory interventions targeting social media companies), or is there an appropriate balance with enabling and empowering measures (e.g., increased capability among judicial and law enforcement actors through training and development; investment in support for digital safety and security training for journalists; requirements for social media companies to support women journalists under attack)?

14. Do legal responses come with gender-aware guidance and training for implementation by law enforcement, prosecutors and judges, concerning the need to protect the core right of freedom of expression and the implications of restricting this right as regards online violence against women journalists?

15. While the impacts of online gender-based violence can vary in seriousness, does the response recognise the range of manifestations - from one-off threats of an extremely violent nature, through to the cumulative effects of sustained lower-level harassment and abuse? And does it recognise the distinctions between an individual perpetrator with limited means to execute a threatened act of physical violence, and an orchestrated mob or State-linked attack, for example?

16. Is the response designed to be transparently assessed, and is there a process to systematically monitor and evaluate the freedom of expression impacts (such as through reports to the public, parliamentarians, specific stakeholders)?

17. Is a given response able to be rolled-back if it is found that any benefits are outweighed by negative impacts on freedom of expression, access to information and privacy rights (which are themselves potential antidotes to gender-based violence online)?

18. Are measures relating to the internet companies developed with due regard to multi-stakeholder engagement, and in the interests of promoting transparency and accountability, while avoiding privatisation of censorship?

19. If the response is targeting internet companies, does the measure consider the implications globally? For example, are journalists who use the platform in other countries going to benefit from mechanisms that cater to local languages?

20. Do the responses maximise the openness and availability of relevant data, with due regard to personal privacy protections, held by the social media companies (e.g., evidence of incidents reported; rates of response; time taken to remove content deemed to be in breach of policies; and justifications for content to be removed or retained)? Do they enable independent research and reportage about the scale of the problem and the companies' responses to it?

21. Is there assessment (informed by expert advice) of both the potential and the limits of automated technological responses to gendered online violence (while keeping freedom of expression and privacy rights intact)?

22. Are civil society actors (including NGOs and researchers), women's advocacy groups, and the news media engaged as autonomous partners in regard to combatting online violence through knowledge sharing and facilitation?

23. Are the response measures accompanied by initiatives, programmes or campaigns designed to effect and embed change in the medium to long term, rather than being short term measures?

24. Do the responses proposed to address online gender-based violence against journalists work in tandem with disinformation responses, recognising the frequent links, intersections and overlaps between the two?

25. Do the responses entail parallel measures to combat misogyny, structural sexism and patriarchal norms present in the social context offline?

A note about The Chilling

These recommendations and response assessment framework were commissioned by UNESCO and are also included in the comprehensive report "The Chilling: A global study of online violence against women journalists", edited by Julie Posetti and Nabeelah Shabbir, produced by the International Center for Journalists (ICFJ) with the support of UNESCO and published in November 2020.. A team of 25 international researchers contributed to the study.

UNESCO has previously published two reports from the overarching study: Global Trends in Online Violence Against Women Journalists: A Global Snapshot of Incidents and Impacts (2020), The Chilling: Global Trends in Online Violence Against Women Journalists (2021), as well as two individual chapters: The Chilling: What More Can News Organisations Do to Combat Gendered Online Violence? (2022) and The Chilling: Assessing Big Tech's Response to Online Violence Against Women Journalists (2022).

In parallel with the publication of these recommendations, UNESCO has published another stand alone chapter The Chilling: Legal and Normative Frameworks for Combatting Online Violence Against Women Journalists.